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I. INTRODUCTION
As technology becomes more embedded in society, customer
expectations of both the cost and quality of services have changed
dramatically. While the legal industry has historically been
resistant to such innovation, mounting pressure to lower costs is
driving legal professionals to increasingly leverage the benefits of
technology.1 With a focus on lowering the cost of legal services,
very few commentators have expressed concern about maintaining
or improving the quality of legal services.2 In a recent academic
work, however, prominent legal scholar George Triantis explores
the question of whether law firms can simultaneously improve
legal contract quality while reducing the costs of creating
such.3 Triantis argues that improving contract quality, rather than
simply reducing cost, will help lawyers more effectively respond
to economic pressures and changing technologies.4 Triantis
outlines several barriers to innovation that exist within the
legal industry and explains how limited intellectual property rights
are especially cumbersome to the effort.5 Without intellectual
property protection, Triantis posits that law firms can best
incentivize contract development and overcome barriers to

1. Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 798; see also RICHARD
SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?: RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES 28–33 (2008)
(describing the path from bespoke legal practice to commoditized services).
2. See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN & MICHAEL E. RAYNOR, THE INNOVATOR’S
SOLUTION: CREATING AND SUSTAINING SUCCESSFUL GROWTH (2003). According to Clayton
Christensen’s model, cost-cutting mechanisms regarding document production are
considered disruptions and are likely to result in broadening access to legal services. Law
firms, however, appear to be underinvesting in innovations that would increase quality due
to structural obstacles and the absence of a methodology for valuing transactional legal
services. See id.
3. See George G. Triantis, Improving Contract Quality: Modularity, Technology, and
Innovation in Contract Design, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 177 (2013).
4. Id. at 179–80; see also Triantis, Taking Goldston Chair, Looks at Emerging Threats to
Transactional Legal Practice, HARVARD LAW TODAY (Feb. 28, 2008), https://today.law.
harvard.edu/triantis-taking-goldston-chair-looks-at-emerging-threats-to-transactionallegal-practice/?redirect=1.
5. See Triantis, supra note 3, at 194–97, 195 n.40 (“There appear to be no valid grounds
why legal forms such as contracts, insurance policies, pleadings, and other legal documents
should not be protected under the law of copyright.” (quoting 1-2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.18)); Gerald F. Davis & Heinrich R. Greve,
Corporate Elite Networks and Governance Changes in the 1980s, 103 AM J. SOC. 1, 2–3 fig.1 (1997).
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innovation through collaborative contract design strategies like
standardization and modularity.6
II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This Note considers whether alternative means exist to
incentivize contract innovation in the marketplace, even in the
absence of intellectual property rights. More specifically, the
following analysis evaluates whether smart contract and
blockchain technology can incentivize contract innovation. The
research is designed to assist business lawyers and executives
looking to leverage these technologies and is organized as follows.
Part III provides a brief overview of the business model of
transactional legal services, economic pressures facing the
industry, and barriers to contract innovation. The section then
reviews George Triantis’ recent academic work, in which he argues
that improving contract quality through collaborative design best
positions legal professionals to overcome barriers to innovation
within the industry, despite increased pressure to reduce costs. Part
IV provides a foundational background to smart contracts and
distributed ledger technology (DLT). The Part then examines the
benefits and drawbacks of each to illustrate the legal industry’s
reluctance to adopt the technology to assist contract development
and improvement. Part V hypothesizes that commercial entities
leveraging smart contract and distributed ledger technology may
be in a stronger position than law firms to capture financial returns
from contract innovation—effectively reducing a party’s reliance
upon transactional lawyers to create contracts—since their business
models inherently insulate returns from competitors and eliminate
many of the traditional barriers to innovation found in the legal
industry. Part VI illustrates this alternative method for contract
innovation through a case study featuring IBM and its effort to
leverage smart contracts and distributed ledger technology
through the IBM Watson IoT Platform and Blockchain. Part VII
considers the impact such technology is having on the marketplace

6. See Triantis, supra note 3, at 202–04; see also Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The
Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract
Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 286–89 (1985).
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and whether proprietary contract platforms, like the IBM Watson
IoT Platform and Blockchain, promote or inhibit consumer welfare.
III. BARRIERS TO CONTRACT INNOVATION
At the heart of business dealings is the natural language
agreement—an agreement with specific terms between two or
more persons or entities in which there is a promise to do or refrain
from doing something in return for a benefit of value, known as
consideration.7 Such agreements are the traditional way to
formalize a business relationship and serve as “the basic building
block of [the] market economy.”8 The primary role of transactional
lawyers is to facilitate secure transfers of assets and allocations of
risk through the creation and enforcement of these agreements.9 In
a recent academic work, George Triantis outlines the value these
lawyers provide in contractual dealings and discusses the
innovations acting upon the transactional legal practice.10
A. Stages of Contract Development
More specifically, Triantis observes that lawyers service clients
across three distinct contracting stages, which he classifies as:
“front-end, midstream, and back-end.”11 During the front-end
stage of contracting, lawyers “design, draft, and negotiate”
contracts.12 Most frequently, lawyers utilize standard contract
terms not only to reduce the costs of contract development13 but

7. See Triantis, supra note 3, at 183.
8. Nick Szabo, Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks, FIRST

MONDAY (Sept. 1, 1997), http://www.ojphi.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/548/469.
9. Triantis, supra note 3, at 183–84.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 183; see also George Triantis, James Kowal & Patricia Kowal, Disruption and
Innovation in Transactional Law Practice, STANFORD LAWYER (Nov. 11, 2013), https://law.
stanford.edu/stanford-lawyer/articles/disruption-and-%E2%80%A8innovation-intransactional-law-practice/.
12. Triantis, supra note 3, at 183.
13. A departure from standardized contract terms may increase attorney reading
costs. See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
608, 646–47 (1998); Abraham L. Wickelgren, Standardization as a Solution to the Reading Costs
of Form Contracts, 167 J. INST. THEORETICAL ECON. 30, 39 (2011).
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also to increase the value of terms through network effects.14
Alternatively, lawyers may customize terms to the specific needs of
their clients or even create innovative terms that improve contract
quality.15 Triantis makes an important distinction, however,
between customization and innovation of contract terms. He
defines customization as the “one-time tailoring of a contract term
to a specific transaction and client.”16 Only in rare cases is such
customization or innovation a cost-effective approach to
transacting.17 Thus, lawyers should consider the high costs often
associated with departure from a standardized term relative to the
mere incremental value of including a more customized term.18
Innovation, on the other hand, is defined as the “creation of a new
term that can be redeployed in other transactions and potentially
standardized.”19 Thus, innovation refers to improvements to
contracts that are more significant in degree than customization.20
Once a contract is finalized, the midstream stage begins, during
which each party is expected to perform their respective promises
according to the terms of the contract.21 Exact and complete
performance by both parties discharges the contract and relieves
parties from further legal obligations. To avoid inadvertent
breaches or performance beyond the contract requirements, parties
to the transaction must remain aware of and integrate the terms of
the contract into their business practices.22 Contract obligations are
frequently overlooked and unwittingly modified during this stage,
which demands active monitoring and management of the contract

14. Triantis, supra note 3, at 180–81; see also Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at 286–92;
Henry Greely, Contracts as Commodities: The Influence of Secondary Purchasers on the Form of
Contracts, 42 VAND. L. REV. 133, 159 (1989); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization
and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713,
719–27 (1997); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA.
L. REV. 757, 782–88 (1995).
15. Triantis, supra note 3, at 183–84.
16. Id. at 192.
17. Id. at 183–84; see also THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 89–
91, 114 (2010); Jayanth K. Krishnan, Outsourcing and the Globalizing Legal Profession, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2189, 2204 (2007).
18. Triantis, supra note 3, at 183–84.
19. Id. at 192.
20. Id. at 184.
21. Id.
22. Id.; see also YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 101, 109–15 (2006).
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to ensure proper performance.23 Active contract management is
especially important for business entities that maintain a high
number of contractual relationships with multiple parties.24
The back-end stage of contracting occurs after a contract is
terminated or breached. If a breach or other contract dispute
arises, lawyers intervene on behalf of their clients through various
tools of legal action (e.g., arbitration, mediation, litigation,
settlement negotiations).25
B. Pressure on the Legal Industry to Reduce Costs
Across these stages of contract development, the legal
industry continues to face tremendous pressure to reduce costs.26
Many clients are seeking more cost-efficient services27 and are
opting to disaggregate their expensive legal needs across a
variety of providers in the effort.28 Other clients are allocating
certain components of transactional work to non-lawyer
providers since doing so often results in even more significant
cost savings.29 Legal professionals have responded to these
pressures by focusing time and attention almost exclusively on cost
reduction through methods like increased standardization and
document automation.30
23.
24.
25.
26.

Triantis, supra note 3, at 184.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 201; see also THOMAS J. DELONG, JOHN J. GABARRO & ROBERT J. LEES, WHEN
PROFESSIONALS HAVE TO LEAD: A NEW MODEL FOR HIGH PERFORMANCE 90–93 (2007); DAVID
H. MAISTER, MANAGING THE PROFESSIONAL SERVICE FIRM 4 (1993); Ashish Nanda, Strategy
and Positioning in Professional Service Firms, HARV. BUS. SCH. Case Study No. 9-904-060, 6–10
(2004); Mark A. Cohen, The Legal Industry Needs Fresh Leadership with New Skill Sets, FORBES
(Sept. 18, 2017, 06:35 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/markcohen1/2017/09/18/thelegal-industry-needs-fresh-leadership-with-new-skill-sets/#3323575c67d7.
27. Many legal tasks once performed solely by attorneys are being outsourced to more
cost-effective legal service providers, automated through technology solutions, swallowed
by in-house corporate legal departments, or made available for free to low-revenue clients
in hopes of eventually transitioning them to a paid client at a later date (e.g., Cooley LLP’s
launch of the CooleyGo platform—a mobile-friendly microsite that provides a range of free
legal and business content to start-ups with formation, financing, team building, intellectual
property, M&A, etc.). Cohen, supra note 26; COOLEYGO, https://www.cooleygo.com/ (last
visited Feb. 8, 2020). Not surprisingly, purchasers of legal services—not law firms
themselves—are driving this industry change. Cohen, supra note 26.
28. Triantis, supra note 3, at 201.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 192.
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As professional services, like contract development, become
more standardized—meaning, they are “simple enough to be used
by individuals with relatively little training and the procedures
themselves can be sold to end users as commodities”—the services
naturally drift toward cheaper and less prestigious market sectors,
effectively becoming commoditized.31 In other words, successfully
reducing costs through standardization often results in greater
commoditization of law firm services.32 Clients subsequently
become accustomed to paying for less expensive commoditized
offerings and, in turn, question the value of returning to a higher
price point.33 With such inexpensive commoditized services
available, law firms face an increased challenge of persuading
clients of the value of customized or “premium” legal services.34
Despite this emphasis this emphasis on lowering the costs of
transactional legal services, few have expressed concern about
maintaining or improving the quality of contracts through
innovation.35 Triantis is one of a few academics raising this issue.
He argues that developing new ways to improve the quality of
transactional services will help lawyers redesign their business
models to more effectively respond to industry pressures and
emerging technologies.36 While innovation37 is central to improving
the quality of contracts, Triantis maintains that several barriers
impede such innovation in the legal industry.38 These barriers
include the customary deployment of standardized contract terms
31. Id. at 201; see also What the Future Legal Market Means for Lawyers and Bar
Associations, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/bar_services/publications/bar_
leader/2012_13/july_august/what_future_legal_market_means_lawyers_bar_
associations/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2020).
32. Triantis, supra note 3, at 185; see also Nanda, supra note 26, at 6–10; Thomson
Reuters, Don’t Be Commoditized: How to Rise to the Top as the Competition Races to the Bottom,
ATTORNEY AT WORK (July 20, 2018), https://www.attorneyatwork.com/lawyers-dont-becommoditized/.
33. Triantis, supra note 3, at 202.
34. Id.; see also Russ Alan Prince, How Law Firms Can Overcome the Commoditization
Crisis in Legal Services, FORBES (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
russalanprince/2017/11/28/how-law-firms-can-overcome-the-commoditization-crisis-inlegal-services/#7acbb26d10a1.
35. Triantis, supra note 3, at 192.
36. Id. at 179–80.
37. Triantis defines innovation as “the creation of a new [legal] term that can be
redeployed in other transactions and potentially standardized.” Id. at 192.
38. Id. at 180.
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without change,39 the limited intellectual property protection
available to drafters of novel contract language,40 market resistance
to the adoption of novel terms,41 and structural features of legal
entities that value client service over innovation, etc.42
C. Standardization of Contract Terms
A primary barrier to contract innovation is the tension between
capturing the benefits associated with deploying standardized
contract terms and encouraging their improvement.43 Contracts
and their embedded terms are rarely, if ever, created from scratch.44
Both law firms and individual lawyers often store documents from
prior transactions and subsequently reuse developed contract
provisions as a perceived procedural best practice.45 Such
standardization has “a long tradition in transactional legal
practice” and provides a range of benefits, including efficiency, cost
reduction, simplified negotiations with opposing parties, and a
lower risk of undesirable judicial interpretation.46 Standardization
is often supported by a similar transactional technique known as
contract modularity. Modularity refers to the ability of components
within a system to be separated or combined without
compromising the completeness of the rest of the system.47 In other
words, contracts are “modular to the degree that their parts can be
drafted and read without adjustment or reference to other parts of

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 192.
Id. at 195.
Id.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 184; see also Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at 286–92.
Triantis, supra note 3, at 186.
Id.
Id.
A classic study of modularity is 1 CARLISS Y. BALDWIN & KIM B. CLARK, DESIGN
RULES: THE POWER OF MODULARITY 63 (2000) (defining modularity). The modularity of
contracts has been observed by several scholars. E.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Language,
Deals, and Standards: The Future of XML Contracts, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 313, 324 (2006);
Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning of Consent, 104
MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1224 (2006) (“Boilerplate can be used not just for standardization but,
because terms can be used as building blocks, for customization.”); Henry E. Smith,
Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1180 (2006)
(“[A]djustment can happen within modules without causing major ripple effects”).
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the contract.”48 Modularity often reduces transactional costs
because it allows a firm to divide contracts into individual
components and allocate those components to various attorneys—
many of whom are junior associates with lower billing rates—
which facilitates independent and simultaneous drafting of
components that will ultimately be combined into one final
contract.49 Junior associates, for example, will often complete the
majority of the initial legal drafting, with more senior attorneys
providing guidance and supervision along the way.50
Standardization and modularity offer a number of benefits,
such as the ability to reduce overall costs through knowledge
sharing.51 Effective standardization fundamentally relies on a law
firm’s redeployment of contract terms across its transactions as well
as the sharing of those terms with other firms.52 In doing so, the
standard contract term gains widespread adoption, which benefits
all parties in the industry utilizing the term. While the firm drafting
the term captures economies of scale53 by applying it to multiple
transactions, the non-drafting party benefits in that a standard term
is easier to read and understand. This allows the non-drafting party
to more quickly process the familiar term, which reduces reading
costs and simplifies negotiations over contract language to the
benefit of both parties.54 The tradition of knowledge sharing
within and across law firms advances this mutually beneficial

48. Triantis, supra note 3, at 191.
49. Id. at 202. “Developing even a simple form requires several hours of attorney time

at multiple levels of the organization (i.e., junior associate level, partner level, and practice
group leader level).” Patrick Dundas, Legal Document Drafting – Tools and Practices That
Enhance a Firm’s Competitive Edge, in LAW FIRM KM: DRIVING PRACTICE INNOVATION AND
REDEFINING SERVICE DELIVERY 39, 54 (Laura Slater ed., 2016).
50. Kenneth A. Adams, Law Firms and Contract Drafting: A Panel Discussion at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School, ADAMS ON CONT. DRAFTING 1, 1–2 (Mar. 8, 2009),
https://www.adamsdrafting.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/Penn-Law-PanelDiscussion-3.8.09.pdf.
51. Triantis, supra note 3, at 187.
52. Id.
53. “An economy of scale is achieved when increasing the scale of production
decreases long-term average costs. In other words, the cost of production per unit decreases
as a company produces more units. Reducing the cost per unit of production is the most
significant advantage created by economies of scale.” Prateek Agarwal, Economies of Scale,
INTELLIGENT ECONOMIST, https://www.intelligenteconomist.com/economies-of-scale/ (last
updated Apr. 11, 2019).
54. Triantis, supra note 3, at 186.
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process, enabling significant time and cost savings at all three
stages of the contracting process.55 Accordingly, firms are strongly
incentivized to focus on cutting costs through standardized or
customized transactional products rather than creating more
innovation provisions.56
Another benefit of standardized contract terms is the intrinsic
value that accompanies more predictable judicial interpretation.
Standard terms, with their widespread usage, are more likely to
have been interpreted by a court and enforced by precedent.57
Increased certainty regarding a term’s interpretation allows
lawyers to better avoid and/or predict the likely outcomes of
potential disputes.58 Such insights also create more efficient legal
drafting, which reduces costs on the front-end stage.59 Standard
terms reduce the need for and cost of interpretation of a provision
in court and guard against judicial error since existing precedent is
available to advise informal interpretation.60 Greater certainty of
enforcement and familiarity of standard provisions also facilitates
the assignability or liquidity of contracts.61 Contracts are generally
considered more valuable in the market “if they can readily be

55. Id. at 187. Lawyers also collaborate across firms to produce contracts through
organizations like the American Bar Foundation and the American Bar Association. E.g.,
Comm. on Tr. Indentures and Indenture Trs., ABA Section of Bus. Law, Model Negotiated
Covenants and Related Definitions, 61 BUS. LAW. 1439 (2006); Ad Hoc Comm. for Revision of
the 1983 Model Simplified Indenture, et al., Am. Bar. Ass’n, Revised Model Simplified Indenture,
55 BUS. L. 1115 (2000). Some regulatory requirements also mandate disclosure of contract
forms—under securities law, for example, Regulation S-K mandates the periodic disclosure
of material contracts. 17 C.F.R § 229.601(b)(10) (2014).
56. Triantis, supra note 3, at 209; see also Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path
Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74
WASH. U. L. REV. 347, 349 (1996) (“If one looks more closely at actual standard terms, . . . one
finds disturbing instances of apparent suboptimality: standard terms that do not work in a
reasonable manner; and uniformity in terms where one would expect more diversity to be
optimal.”).
57. Triantis, supra note 3, at 181.
58. Id. at 186.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 194; see also JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT,
INTEREST AND MONEY 158 (1936) (“Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to
fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.”). A “herding bias” may exist among
lawyers due to risk aversion and the way a legal reputation is drawn primarily from
outcomes—that is, whether or not a term gives rise to litigation or an unfavorable
interpretation. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 56, at 355–58.
61. Triantis, supra note 3, at 194–95.
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assigned or traded” to non-drafting third-parties.62 Thus,
drafting parties who depart from standardized terms to include
unfamiliar contract terms not only lose the benefits of network and
learning externalities, but also discount the secondary market value
of their contracts.63
While standardization offers many benefits, primarily in the
form of reliability and cost savings, it can stifle incentive among
lawyers to develop and adopt novel contract terms.64 When
adopted by the industry at large, standardized contract terms
effectively “lock in market standards,” which create a form of path
dependency.65 Path dependency theory suggests that the continued
use of a certain practice occurs simply because “it is often easier or
more cost-effective to continue along an already set path than to
create an entirely new one.”66 Thus, a form of professional social
pressure exists, from both clients and law firm partners, to use and
conform to traditional terms and practices. Any lawyer who creates
or adopts novel contract terms is likely to face industry resistance,
as such terms require other professionals to exhaust more resources
than would otherwise be necessary to interpret them.67 Innovators
also risk unanticipated judicial interpretations.68 For these reasons,
standardization of contract terms conflicts with innovation and
furthers the industry’s already natural bias toward the status quo.69

62. Id. at 195; cf. Marc Oliver Bettzüge & Thorsten Hens, An Evolutionary Approach to
Financial Innovation, 68 REV. ECON. STUD. 493, 505 (2001) (discussing how a particularly
important feature of financial innovation is whether it can be standardized and traded in a
liquid market—standardized and modular legal contracts are an example of a liquid asset).
63. Triantis, supra note 3, at 194; Wickelgren, supra note 13.
64. Triantis, supra note 3, at 209.
65. Id. at 192.
66. Caroline Banton, Path Dependency, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.
com/terms/p/path-dependency.asp (last updated June 25, 2019).
67. Triantis, supra note 3, at 181; cf. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contracts as
Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1133, 1137–38 (2006).
68. Triantis, supra note 3, at 194; see also Choi & Gulati, supra note 67, at 1167 (proposing
that judges interpret contracts as statutes and consider the intent of the first adopters of a
boilerplate provision).
69. Triantis, supra note 3, at 182; Korobkin, supra note 13 (discussing research findings
in which study participants favored a familiar contract term to a new one).
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D. Limited Intellectual Property Protection
Another obstacle to innovation is the limited intellectual
property protection available to drafters for novel contract
language. Fundamentally, no one can gain a monopoly over
elementary legal words and phrases that exist in the public
domain.70 Similarly, legal forms that borrow standard language do
not qualify for copyright protection71 simply because of minor
changes in syntax or the addition of a few words. Although word
arrangements have likely been altered, they are, at best, merely a
paraphrasing of earlier forms and there is nothing recognizably
different from the language used before.72 Specific language of a
contract, however, may be protected by the author’s copyright, but
only if it is specific and original.73 Thus, “[e]ven specific, original
language might lose its copyright if it is judicially interpreted and
becomes part of the common law.”74 “Other expressions of the same
idea[,]” however, are not protected under copyright law.75
Therefore, those wishing to avoid copyright infringement can
easily replicate innovative contract provisions by simply avoiding
the specific language used by the original drafter.76 “Improvements
in contract language are also difficult to protect as trade secrets
because at least one other party—the contracting partner—has
access to the language, and some material contracts must be

70. 2 PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY & ROBERT P. MERGES, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2017 (2017 ed. 2017). “The term ‘public domain’
refers to creative materials that are not protected by intellectual property laws”—instead,
“[t]he public owns these works, not an individual author or artist” and “[a]nyone can use a
public domain work without obtaining permission[.]” Welcome to the Public Domain, STAN. U.
LIBR., https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/public-domain/welcome/ (last visited Feb.
13, 2020).
71. “Copyright, a form of intellectual property law, protects original works of
authorship.” Copyright in General, COPYRIGHT.GOV, https://www.copyright.gov/help/
faq/faq-general.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2020) (emphasis added).
72. Triantis, supra note 3, at 195.
73. Id.; see also 1–2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 2.18.
74. Triantis, supra note 3, at 195; see also Larry E. Ribstein, Sticky Forms, Property Rights,
and Law, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 65, 73–74 (2011) (referencing Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l,
Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 793–95 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Bldg. Officials Code Adm’rs. v. Code
Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 731, 734–35 (1st Cir. 1980)).
75. Triantis, supra note 3, at 195.
76. See id.

810

004.NASH_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

799

3/25/20 9:06 PM

Blockchain & Smart Contract Technology

publicly disclosed as a matter of law.”77 A debate also persists
regarding whether contract terms can be patented.78
Without intellectual property protection, contract innovators
are unlikely to obtain any meaningful return (financial or
otherwise) when deploying a term or provision in a third-party
transaction.79 If developed at all, such terms “typically emerge at
the []premium end” of the legal market and thereafter evolve to
commoditized services.80 Under the current system, an upmarket
lawyer or firm that develops novel terms cannot effectively isolate
and realize a financial return on those terms despite taking on
significant market risk, even if the term becomes widely adopted.81
If one party to a transaction, for example, assumes the cost of
developing an innovative contract provision, the non-drafting
party would likewise receive the benefit of such without incurring
an equivalent cost.82 Even entities who are not parties within the
exchange can adopt the term since many material contracts are
necessarily disclosed to the public. And since the most a firm
developing a new term can hope for is an arguable reputational
bump among clients and other firms, little incentive exists for it to
innovate, unless a client is willing to a pay a premium for highly
customized and unique work. Consequently, parties often invest as
little as possible into contract production, which perpetuates the
use of inefficient and increasingly archaic terms.83
E. Market Resistance to Adopting Novel Terms
In addition, novel contract terms rarely survive unless the
innovator can effectively reduce the time lapse between a term’s
creation and its adoption by the industry as a new standard. Those
hoping for widespread adoption must develop and leverage broad
channels to disperse the term immediately upon creation.84 Triantis

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 196 (footnotes omitted); see also 17 C.F.R. § 229.601 (2019).
See generally Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609–11 (2010).
See Triantis, supra note 3, at 195–96.
Id. at 185. See generally MAISTER, supra note 26.
Triantis, supra note 3, at 181.
Id. at 197.
Id.
Id. at 195.

811

004.NASH_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/25/20 9:06 PM

2019

offers the creation and deployment of the “poison pill”85 by
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz—a prominent New York law
firm—as an example of an effective channel strategy.86 To
effectively proliferate the provision, Wachtell undertook an
aggressive promotional campaign to convince a broad range of
corporate managers—many of whom were not previously clients
of the firm—to incorporate the poison pill into their contracts. The
law firm simultaneously reduced client skepticism of the provision
by absorbing all of the back-end stage risk of the term and taking
steps to ensure it would not be struck down by the courts.87 This
approach enabled the firm to effectively realize a financial return
on the term since its development of the poison pill generated
additional revenue from new clients. This example, however, is
difficult for other law firms to imitate since the organizational
structure of Wachtell is uniquely positioned toward innovation
rather than standardization.88
F. Structural Features of Legal Entities
Structural features that exist within law firms, government, and
industry associations serve as another barrier to contract
innovation.89 Traditional law firm practices, like hourly fee billing
and billable hour compensation, for example, emphasize efficient

85. A “poison pill” is a contract provision designed to protect public companies from
hostile takeovers. Marie Baca, What Is a Poison Pill?, CBS NEWS (Aug. 11, 2008, 3:00 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/what-is-a-poison-pill/.
86. Triantis, supra note 3, at 199–200; see also “Marketing” at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &
Katz, HARV. BUS. SCH. Case Study 9-496-037 (1995). Once Wachtell had successfully defended
the poison pill in the Delaware courts, the term became quite standard in the industry. Id.
87. Triantis, supra note 3, at 200.
88. See Paul Hodkinson, Wachtell Partner: ‘We Are Not That Modern’, LAW.COM (Mar.
25, 2019, 7:54 AM), https://www.law.com/2019/03/25/a-qa-with-wachtell-we-are-notthat-modern-292-42566/?slreturn=20190725173253; David J. Parnell, Daniel Neff of Wachtell
Lipton: On Leading the Market’s Most Prestigious Law Firm, FORBES (Feb. 24, 2016, 1:53 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidparnell/2016/02/24/daniel-neff-wachtell-lipton-onleading-most-prestigious-law-firm/#23626d547d44; Kathryn Rubino, The Key to Wachtell’s
Success? How They Pay Their Partners, ABOVE L. (Sept. 24, 2018, 3:45 PM),
https://abovethelaw.com/2018/09/the-key-to-wachtells-success-how-they-pay-theirpartners/; Casey Sullivan, M&A Power Wachtell Could Be ‘Last True Law Partnership’, BIG L.
BUS. (Sept. 20, 2018), https://biglawbusiness.com/m-a-power-wachtell-could-be-last-truelaw-partnership.
89. Triantis, supra note 3, at 202.
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client service rather than innovation.90 Such emphasis prevents
firms from investing in the very research and development that
could lead to discovering and developing innovative transactional
terms.91 Law firms that attempt to pursue both standardization and
innovation are still unlikely to overcome impediments to
innovation, since a “blurred business strategy” often threatens
every other feature of a firm, including governance, compensation,
and promotion.92 Organizational biases within firms may also act
as an impediment to innovation. While law firms frequently
succeed in hiring professionals with diverse legal skills, they often
fall victim to the tendency of hiring individuals with profiles
similar to those of current employees (e.g., partners hiring students
from their alma maters).93 Hierarchy and collegiality within firms
can also discourage individual lawyers from altering precedent
forms of legal terms. In many cases, this is true of junior associates
trying to avoid offending a partner who authored the provision in
question.94 These collective realities combine to make law firms a
relatively hostile environment for innovation.95
Government, often through the court system and legislature, is
an alternative source of innovation through default rules designed

90. See id. at 186. See generally William Kummel, Note, A Market Approach to Law Firm
Economics: A New Model for Pricing, Billing, Compensation and Ownership in Corporate Legal
Services, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 379 (1996); S. S. Samuelson & L. J. Jaffe, A Statistical Analysis of
Law Firm Profitability, 70 B.U. L. REV. 185 (1990).
91. See Triantis, supra note 3, at 186.
92. Id. at 202. See generally MAISTER, supra note 26.
93. Triantis, supra note 3, at 199.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 186; see also Mark A. Cohen, Legal Change: Why Drip, Not Disruption?, FORBES
(Apr. 26, 2018, 6:35 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/markcohen1/2018/04/26/legalchange-why-drip-not-disruption/#6a1210721fbf.
Law firms have been slow to respond [with innovation] to changing market
conditions for a variety of reasons, including: (1) an initial hope that the postrecession marketplace would ‘return to normalcy’—it hasn’t and won’t; (2) their
economic models are inimical to it; (3) an inability to raise investment capital due
to regulatory constraints (an irony since lawyers are self-regulated); (4) lack of
expertise in tech and process driven legal delivery and the unwillingness to accord
it equal status with legal acumen; (5) the partnership model that ‘whacks up
profits’ rather than re-investing them (‘short-termism’); and (6) passivity of buyers
emanating from lawyers selling to other lawyers (that’s changing). Firms have
made changes, but largely internal ones that sustain profit-per-partner (PPP), the
holy grail of their metrics.
Id.
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to serve a broader social interest, as compared to that of private law
firms.96 Such government entities, however, often lack the
resources to design efficient default provisions, other than in
circumstances where a simple rule is available that fits a wide range
of contexts.97 As a result, default provisions are often created
through the collaborative effort of legal practitioners, academics,
and non-legal industry experts.98 This “public production of default
terms,” however, has come under considerable criticism from
academics.99 In addition, government regulators and legislators
may also be influenced by dominant interest groups or pursue selfserving personal agendas, both of which may distort any incentive
to innovate.100
In conclusion, Triantis suggests that law firms can more
effectively respond to industry pressures and emerging
technologies—while simultaneously overcoming the many
impediments to contract innovation—by leveraging principles of
modularity that improve the quality of their transactional
services.101 This theory, however, fails to fully consider whether
alternative methods exist for incentivizing contract innovation
outside traditional law firms.
IV. DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY AND SMART CONTRACTS
Despite the barriers outlined by Triantis that prevent
development of innovative contract terms, technologies external to
law firms are significantly impacting the cost and quality of
developing transactional agreements.102 One such technology is
that of smart contracts built upon a so-called distributed ledger.
While distributed ledger technology and smart contracts are

96. Triantis, supra note 3, at 198–99.
97. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law,

113 YALE L.J. 541, 598–601 (2003).
98. Triantis, supra note 3, at 197–99.
99. Id. at 198.
100. Id. at 198–99.
101. Id. at 191–92.
102. Id.
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“symbiotically linked” and often referenced synonymously, they
are actually two distinct technologies.103
A. Distributed Ledger Technology
At a fundamental level, DLT is a term broadly used to describe
any method of maintaining a distributed ledger on a network of
computers.104 While often used interchangeably with DLT, the term
“blockchain” is actually a sub-set of the broader technology.105
Confusion around this distinction stems from the fact that the most
common forms of DLT utilize the “blockchain approach,” which
employs a chain of “blocks” to successfully provide secure and
valid means of achieving a distributed consensus.106 Thus, a
blockchain is only one type of data structure considered to be a
distributed ledger.107
A distributed ledger is a decentralized “digital record that is
shared instantaneously across a network of participants”108 which
aims to “establish[] consensus without the need for a centralized
repository of information.”109 The ledger is distributed in that each
participant (or node) in the network holds a copy of the master
ledger.110 Whenever participants make changes to their respective
copies, the network is notified and must agree at regular intervals
which changes will be permanently reflected in the master
ledger.111 Consensus techniques ensure that all network
participants agree with the changes, which prevents the existence
of multiple competing versions of the ledger.112 Thus, the ledger is
decentralized, meaning there is no single administrative center for
103. Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, Inc. & Linklaters, Whitepaper: Smart Contracts
and
Distributed
Ledger—A
Legal
Perspective
8
(Aug.
2017),
https://www.isda.org/a/6EKDE/smart-contracts-and-distributed-ledger-a-legalperspective.pdf [hereinafter ISDA & Linklaters].
104. Id. at 7.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 7, 7 n.10.
107. Id. at 7.
108. Id. at 7.
109. Max Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 305, 318
(2017).
110. ISDA & Linklaters, supra note 103, at 7.
111. Zach Church, Blockchain, Explained, MIT SLOAN SCH. MGMT. (May 25, 2017),
https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/blockchain-explained.
112. ISDA & Linklaters, supra note 103, at 7.
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the network.113 Influence and ownership are shared equally
between network participants.114 Simply put, a distributed ledger
can be thought of as “an army of robots checking up on each others’
work” to achieve an optimal ledger for the network.115 The network
effect of this technology facilitates the transfer of value between
parties without a traditional and trusted third-party intermediary
(e.g., banks).116

Figure 1.0: Transaction Verification Through Distributed Ledger
Technology. Derived from CBInsights.117

113. Lucas Mearian, What Is Blockchain? The Complete Guide, COMPUTERWORLD (Jan. 29,
2019 4:13 PM), https://www.computerworld.com/article/3191077/what-is-blockchainthe-complete-guide.html.
In order to move anything of value over any kind of blockchain, the network [of
nodes] must first agree that that transaction is valid, which means no single entity
can go in and say one way or the other whether or not a transaction happened. . . .
To hack it, you wouldn’t just have to hack one system like in a bank . . . , you’d
have to hack every single computer on that network, which is fighting against you
doing that.
Id.
114. Id.; see infra Figure 1.0.
115. Rob Marvin, Blockchain in 2017: The Year of Smart Contracts, PC MAG.
(Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.pcmag.com/article/350088/blockchain-in-2017-the-year-ofsmart-contracts.
116. Simon J.D. Schillebeeckx, Miguel Soriano & Ernie G.S. Teo, Sing. Mgmt. Univ.,
Blockchain and Smart Contracts: Industry Roundtable Discussion Paper 6 (June 29, 2016),
https://www.smu.edu.sg/sites/business.smu.edu.sg/files/business/Strategy_Organisati
on/BlockChainReport_2016_02_highres.pdf [hereinafter Sing. Mgmt. Univ.].
117. This figure is derived from What Is Blockchain Technology?, CBINSIGHTS (Sept. 11,
2018), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/what-is-blockchain-technology/.
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Notably, distributed ledgers have the capacity to be either
public or private.118 Many popular distributed ledgers (e.g., the
blockchain supporting Bitcoin) are considered public or
permissionless, which means anyone from the public domain can
see its data and participate in the network.119 In the true spirit of
DLT, no participant within the public network has “superadministrator-type rights.”120 However, most work in the financial
and professional services industries that leverage the technology is
conducted on private or permissioned networks.121 Participation in
these networks is, of course, limited to relevant contributors,
regulators, and parties to the transactions.122 While copies of the
ledger are still distributed within the network, private ledgers
introduce a degree of centralization by granting “some override or
super-administrator-type rights” to a single entity or group of
entities over how the distributed ledger operates.123 The
privatization of distributed ledgers is essential to draw commercial
parties to the technology considering the confidential and sensitive
nature of their information and data.124
B. Smart Contracts
With a distributed ledger serving as the platform upon which
smart contracts are hosted and executed, a smart contract can be
thought of as an automated and self-executed (and therefore selfenforced) agreement dictated by a predetermined set of conditional
actions.125 Like the technology upon which it is built, smart
contracts are designed to enable parties to conduct transactions
without the need for a middleman.126 The term “smart contract”
was introduced by Nick Szabo in 1996 when he described it as “a
set of promises, specified in digital form, including protocols

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

ISDA & Linklaters, supra note 103.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Raskin, supra note 109, at 306, 306 n.1.
Sing. Mgmt. Inst., supra note 116, at 6.
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within which the parties perform on these promises.”127 Szabo
analogizes the self-executing nature of smart contracts with the
operation of a common vending machine.128 Vending machines are
designed to automatically dispense selected products when
customers insert the amount of money required to purchase the
product.129 Upon “unilateral acceptance” by the customer in the
form of inserted money, these machines complete their side of the
contract automatically.130 This example captures the essence of
what a smart contract is and does.
Since Szabo’s introduction of the term, however, the technology
surrounding smart contracts has evolved considerably. As a result,
there are now many competing definitions for a smart contract.131
Technologists, for example, think of smart contracts more as the
computer code that enables the contract.132 Whereas attorneys think
of smart contracts more as the obligations assumed by each party
to the smart contract.133 In an opinion piece, attorney Joshua Stark
articulates two competing definitions for a smart contract, which
could more accurately be thought of as complementary
components within a smart contract: (1) “smart contract code”—
computer code that is stored on the distributed ledger and
“designed to self-execute certain tasks if pre-defined conditions are
met”; and (2) “smart legal contracts”—digital contracts (designed
either to complement or entirely substitute natural language
agreements) with the potential of “creating legally enforceable
rights” that are executed by software embedded with smart
contract code.134 In other words, a smart legal contract always
contains at least one piece of smart contract code, but not all pieces
of smart contract code equate to a smart legal contract.135 Smart

127. Smart Contracts All. & Deloitte, Smart Contracts: 12 Use Cases for Business and
Beyond 8 (Dec. 2016), http://digitalchamber.org/assets/smart-contracts-12-use-cases-forbusiness-and-beyond.pdf.
128. Id. at 3.
129. Raskin, supra note 109, at 306, 314.
130. Id. at 314.
131. ISDA & Linklaters, supra note 103, at 4.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 5; see also Josh Stark, Making Sense of Blockchain Smart Contracts, COINDESK
(June 4, 2016), https://www.coindesk.com/making-sense-smart-contracts.
135. ISDA & Linklaters, supra note 103, at 5.
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legal contracts mimic the structure of natural language agreements
since they rely largely upon modular-coded units.136

Figure 2.0: Comparison of Contract Modularity
Distinguishing these two components helps avoid confusion
but unfortunately provides no universal definition of a smart
contract.137 One definition that does appear broad enough to
capture both components was presented by Clack, Bakshi, and
Braine: “A smart contract is an automatable and enforceable
agreement. Automatable by computer, although some parts may
require human input and control. Enforceable either by legal
enforcement of rights and obligations or via tamper-proof
execution of computer code.”138
C. Benefits of Smart Contracts
Given their broad application, smart contracts offer several
advantages over traditional natural language agreements. Some
proponents focus primarily on the ability to reduce transaction
costs.139 Others emphasize the potential for increased efficiency
among parties to the transactions and the lawyers who assist

136.
137.
138.
139.

See Figure 2.0.
ISDA & Linklaters, supra note 103, at 5.
Id.
Raskin, supra note 109, at 309.
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them.140 Perhaps the most compelling benefit of the technology,
however, are the promises of reduced contract ambiguity and more
certain outcomes. Though similar to the vending machine example
outlined in section IV.B, smart contracts are significantly more
powerful. A smart contract, for example, can support the execution
of multiple transactions at any given moment, whereas a vending
machine is only capable of supporting a single transaction.141 The
technology also has the potential to prevent the hassle and expense
of contract breaches, which effectively eliminates the need for thirdparty enforcement.142
Either party to a natural language agreement may voluntarily
breach at any time. Parties to a smart contract, however, are
prevented from such voluntary breach since their transaction is
designed to self-execute upon the occurrence of a designated
event.143 Thus, the self-executing nature of a smart contract
effectively eliminates the need for a third-party enforcer since no
breach is ever allowed to occur in the first place.144 Additionally,
there is also far less potential for ambiguity in computer
programming code—which is the basis for smart contracts—than
there is in words that comprise natural language agreements.145
These and other benefits associated with smart contracts suggest
that adopting the technology may be one solution for law firms
seeking to conform to the pressures facing the legal industry.
D. Drawbacks of Smart Contracts
Despite these apparent benefits, however, smart contracts are
not a perfect solution and come with their own set of limitations

140. See id. at 319; James Bellamy & Chris Hill, Can the Blockchain Make Our Contracts
Smarter?, 21 No. 11 CYBERSPACE L. NL 2 (2016).
141. ISDA & Linklaters, supra note 103, at 6.
142. Michael Bacina, Smart Contracts and Contract Disputes, MEDIUM (Nov. 22, 2018),
https://medium.com/@MikeBacina/smart-contracts-and-contract-disputes-4f277ae0b556.
“Blockchain . . . instantly reduces the workload needed for a party to prepare[] for
enforcement of a breach of contract, and may lead to many disputes never reaching the
lawyers in the case of self enforcing smart contracts or records which can’t be disputed.” Id.
143. Raskin, supra note 109, at 309; ISDA & Linklater, supra note 103, at 9.
144. ISDA & Linklater, supra note 103, at 9.
145. Raskin, supra note 109, at 324. There is less ambiguity in computer code since it is
“more robotic than human interpretation, given its reliance on specified rules that limit term
recognition.” Id. at 324, 326.
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and drawbacks.146 Contrary to common perception, smart legal
contracts (with their embedded smart contract code) rarely exist
independent of natural language agreements.147 This is largely
because smart contract code is often an inadequate or ineffective
way to convey complex legal language.148 So the vast majority of
commercial agreements continue to be comprised of boilerplate
terms and clauses designed to guard against liability.149 As a result,
smart legal contracts are unlikely to ever fully replace natural
language agreements, as they are not ideally suited for every
business transaction.150 Natural language agreements, more likely
than not, will continue to exist and evolve as a combination of both
natural legal language and computer code.151
For example, Stark provides a use case of how a supplier and
distributor could enter into a contract for goods and capture the
payment terms in smart contract code designed to automatically
execute upon delivery of those goods.152 While the delivery of
goods and amount due are straightforward enough terms to be
captured in smart contract code, other terms may be too
ambiguous. If the distributor, for instance, desired compensation
146. Raskin, supra note 109, at 309; Karen Lewis, Blockchain: Four Use Cases Transforming
Business, IBM: INTERNET OF THINGS BLOG (May 25, 2017), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/
internet-of-things/iot-blockchain-use-cases/.
147. Eliza Mik, Smart Contracts: Terminology, Technical Limitations and Real World
Complexity, 9 L. INNOVATION & TECH. 269, 285 (2017).
148. Stark, supra note 134; see also Mik, supra note 147.
At present, the input parameters and the execution steps for a smart contract need
to be specific and objective. In other words, if ‘x’ occurs, then execute step ‘y.’
Therefore, the actual tasks that smart contracts are performing are fairly
rudimentary . . . . Smart contracts are presently best suited to execute
automatically two types of ‘transactions’ found in many contracts: (1) ensuring the
payment of funds upon certain triggering events and (2) imposing financial
penalties if certain objective conditions are not satisfied. In each case, human
intervention, including through a trusted escrow holder or even the judicial
system, is not required once the smart contract has been deployed and is
operational, thereby reducing the execution and enforcement costs of the
contracting process.
Stuart D. Levi & Alex B. Lipton, An Introduction to Smart Contracts and Their Potential and
Inherent Limitations, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 26, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/26/an-introduction-to-smart-contracts-andtheir-potential-and-inherent-limitations/.
149. Stark, supra note 134.
150. Bellamy & Hill, supra note 140.
151. Stark, supra note 134.
152. Id.

821

004.NASH_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/25/20 9:06 PM

2019

from the supplier for any defective products received, a natural
language agreement would likely be required since identifying
defective goods requires human judgment that goes beyond the
simplistic nature of computer code.153 Despite the difference in
form, these two contracting techniques—smart contract code and
natural language agreements—may effectively coexist as part of a
blended legal contract.154

Figure 3.0: Blended Legal Contract
Significant issues also surround the efficacy and
implementation of smart legal contracts.155 Fundamental contract
law, for example, still requires that an offer be “clearly and
unambiguously accepted,” even if a smart legal contract is
technically capable of self-executing.156 Thus, attorneys utilizing
smart legal contracts must ensure parties satisfy all requirements
needed to form a valid contract.157 Similarly, smart legal contracts
pose the challenge of how to effectively resolve desired
modifications to the agreement.158 The execution of an intended

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
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smart legal contract depends entirely upon the accuracy of the
smart contract code embedded within it.159 Rectifying errors in such
a contract may prove challenging, especially if such errors are
discovered after the contract has already self-executed.160 Smart
legal contracts may also require at least some level of “active
monitoring” to ensure both parties fulfill their legal obligations.161
Another issue associated with smart legal contracts is that of
information confidentiality and security for both public and private
distributed ledgers.162 The public nature of traditional distributed
ledgers may discourage commercial adaptation of the platform
entirely, unless a private ledger is utilized with stricter controls
over user access.163 Yet, even private distributed ledgers operated
by third-parties should be carefully evaluated to ensure the
existence of proper confidentiality provisions.164 Even with these
precautions, entities leveraging the technology may still be subject
to large-scale data and information breaches, which often occur
unexpectedly and even among some of the most robust and
well-designed platforms.165 This is especially true of private
distributed ledgers since they forgo a primary benefit of the
technology—that is, an open-source platform that allows and
encourages experts to inspect and resolve flaws and vulnerabilities
in the computer code.166
Despite these apparent drawbacks, economists still view smart
contracts and DLT as “a general-purpose technology,” which
means their implementation will likely still result in a variety of
applications that affect nearly every industry vertical.167 While the
technology has endless applications, the most germane use cases

159. Mimi Zou, Grace Cheng & Marta Soria Heredia, In Code We Trust? Trustlessness
and Smart Contracts, SCL (Apr. 1, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://www.scl.org/articles/10493-incode-we-trust-trustlessness-and-smart-contracts.
160. Bellamy & Hill, supra note 140.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Haseeb Qureshi, A Hacker Stole $31M of Ether—How It Happened, and What It Means
for Ethereum, FREECODECAMP (July 20, 2017), https://medium.freecodecamp.org/a-hackerstole-31m-of-ether-how-it-happened-and-what-it-means-for-ethereum-9e5dc29e33ce.
166. Bellamy & Hill, supra note 140.
167. Church, supra note 111.
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appear to be those that involve “straightforward clauses” with
“clearly defined outcomes.”168 For these types of contractual
arrangements, smart contracts and DLT have the capacity to
effectively replace much of the routine work currently conducted
by transactional lawyers across the three stages of contracting.
Though greater efficiencies and reduced costs make the
technology attractive to legal professionals, understandable
skepticism continues to impede its widespread adoption by the
industry. The still early and untested nature of smart contracts and
DLT continues to drive most transactional lawyers—who are
primarily responsible for facilitating secure and predictable
transfers of value—to continue their reliance upon paper-based
natural language agreements.169 In addition, the same barriers that
impede innovation in the drafting of natural language agreements
also deter lawyers from innovating through smart contracts and
DLT. These barriers include standardization of contract terms,
limited intellectual property protection, market resistance to
adopting novel terms, and structural features of legal entities. Thus,
a total and immediate shift toward the technology remains
unlikely. These realities coupled with the other obstacles identified
by Triantis will likely impede contract innovation in the traditional
law firm model.
V. CAPTURING GREATER RETURNS, PLATFORM DOMINANCE
& BLOCKCHAIN LOCK-IN
While the legal profession appears hesitant to completely
integrate smart contracts and DLT, commercial entities are actively
seeking the benefits of their adoption and implementation. Many
of these entities have created DLT systems that allow others to
capture operational value by uploading their data, which can
subsequently be analyzed and leveraged to develop efficient
business transactions through smart contracts. Such systems have

168. John Ream, Yang Chu & David Schatsky, Upgrading Blockchains: Smart Contract Use
Cases in Industry, DELOITTE: DELOITTE INSIGHTS (June 8, 2016), https://www2.deloitte.
com/insights/us/en/focus/signals-for-strategists/using-blockchain-for-smartcontracts.html.
169. Dan Puterbaugh, The Future of Contracts: Automation, Blockchain, and Smart
Contracts, ACC DOCKET, Dec. 2016, at 48, 50.
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the potential to serve as “an entirely different platform”—outside
of the traditional legal model—for parties to create and enforce
agreements.170 Such alternative contracting platforms could
effectively reduce and/or eliminate a client’s need for a
transactional lawyer in the drafting of traditional natural language
agreements. As a result, large commercial entities are likely in the
strongest position to capture financial returns from contract
innovation and the development of such platforms since their
business models inherently insulate such returns from
competitors.171 Thus, commercial entities utilizing DLT and smart
contracts may be more effective engines of innovation than law
firms that simply leverage tools of modularity.
Traditional law firms, as noted above, often struggle to capture
returns from novel contract provisions because the value of textual
legal language is instantly shared with both parties to the contract
and sometimes with the public at large.172 In contrast, contract
innovations developed by a commercial entity with a DLT platform
often take a different form than mere textual language. Since these
platforms utilize smart contract technology, innovation to their
contracts usually occurs through smart contract code. Using a
customer’s data, for example, an entity could create a series of
smart legal contracts that automate various transactions within a
customer’s supply chain. Over time, that entity would likely
develop more efficient ways to manage the customer’s supply
chain, which would result in the creation of an increasingly robust
mega-contract—that is, a series of interconnected smart legal
contracts—for the customer. Unlike textual legal language, such
innovation is not immediately accessible by competitors since no
single contracting party to the transaction has visibility of the smart
contract code for the customer’s entire mega-contract. Rather, a
contracting party to a smart legal contract would only have
visibility into the smart contract code of the individual transaction
to which they are a party. The contracting party would not,
however, have access to the customer’s other interconnected smart
170. Matthew Jennejohn, The Architecture of Contract Innovation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 71,
80 (2018).
171. Triantis, supra note 3, at 196.
172. Id. at 197.
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legal contracts, which interconnectivity is ultimately the innovation
that commercial entities are offering. Therefore, even without
intellectual property rights, commercial entities are better
positioned to protect such innovation from competition.
Commercial entities also benefit directly from developing such
robust contracts over time for individual customers. Customers
that capture efficiencies and cost savings through the technology
are more likely to increase their usage. As a customer increases
the amount of data managed on an entity’s DLT platform, they
naturally become more dependent upon that entity. Such
dependency drives customer loyalty and lock-in to the
entity’s blockchain. By that point, the cost and time required
to subsequently switch an entire contracted supply chain to
another provider is so exorbitant that such a transition is
simply unreasonable.
Perhaps even more valuable than the lock-in of individual
customers is an entity’s ability to leverage and apply learnings from
previously developed smart contracts. When an entity develops an
innovative smart contract for one customer, the computer code
belongs to the entity. As a result, the entity can immediately reuse
the existing code as a model for other customers with similar
transactional needs. This strategy mimics the use of standardized
contract terms deployed by traditional law firms. Just as legal
professionals store documents and terms from prior transactions
for future use, commercial entities with DLT platforms effectively
do the same with the smart contracts they develop. Such
standardization benefits the commercial entity by establishing
procedural best practices that capture efficiencies and reduce cost.
Standardization deployed by commercial entities is further
supported by another strategy from the legal profession: contract
modularity. Like the text within a natural language agreement,
smart contract code is capable of being independently created and
subsequently separated or combined without compromising the
completeness of the entire smart legal contract. Such modularity
further reduces costs for the commercial entity because it allows a
team of programmers to divide and allocate components of the
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smart contract code, which facilitates independent and
simultaneous creation that can ultimately be combined.173
Though similarities certainly exist between the deployment of
standardized legal language and standardized smart contract code,
there is a key difference worth noting. An important benefit of
standardized legal language is the intrinsic value of predictable
judicial interpretation. To be achieved, however, this benefit
requires widespread use of a standardized provision among legal
professionals in the industry. Such broad usage increases the
likelihood that a court will have interpreted the provision and that
the interpretation will be reinforced by precedent. Consequently,
legal professionals that abandon standardized provisions take on
unnecessary risk, while simultaneously losing network benefits.174
Smart legal contracts, on the other hand, are designed to be selfexecuting and self-enforcing. Since these contracts make it more
difficult to breach the agreement, there is often less need for judicial
interpretation and therefore less incentive among commercial
entities to standardize innovations for predictable interpretation.
This important difference reinforces both the ability of commercial
entities to insulate contract innovation and their incentives to do so.
VI. CASE STUDY: IBM
International Business Machines Corporation’s (IBM)
application of DLT illustrates how this alternative approach to
incentivizing contract innovation may better position commercial
entities, rather than law firms, to protect innovation from
competitors. As a global technology company with a broad range
of cloud-based solutions and business consulting services, IBM
maintains a diverse portfolio of products and services, including
cloud computing, cognitive computing, commerce, data and
analytics, Internet of Things (IoT), IT infrastructure, mobile, and
security.175 More specifically, IBM is attempting to unlock the
potential of DLT by making the technology more accessible to its

173. Id. at 191.
174. Id. at 194–95.
175. Watson
(Computer),

WIKIPEDIA,
(computer) (last visited Feb. 13, 2020).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Watson_
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business clients through its Watson Platform and Blockchain.176
While perhaps the most notable usage scenarios of DLT involve the
financial sector, the technology has broad application to IoT
solutions, which IBM is attempting to leverage.177
A. IBM Watson IoT Platform
Launched in 2011, the IBM Watson Platform is an artificial
intelligence program that uses natural language processing and
machine learning to mine and classify insights from large amounts
of unstructured data in a short period of time.178 A subset of this
technology is the Watson IoT Platform, which unites artificial
intelligence with IoT to improve efficiency and productivity for
IBM’s business clients.179 Broadly speaking, IoT allows a variety of
objects to be sensed or controlled remotely across an existing
network infrastructure.180 This network creates opportunities for
more direct integration of the physical world into computer-based
systems, which drives improved efficiency, accuracy, and
economic benefit through reduced human intervention.181 Despite
its relatively new presence in the market, Watson IoT has already
developed a strong customer base.182 Currently, IBM incentivizes
customers to join its platform by offering free and open access to
Watson IoT and its accompanying development capabilities.183
176. See generally MANAV GUPTA, BLOCKCHAIN FOR DUMMIES: IBM LIMITED
EDITION (2017).
177. Amitranjan Gantait, Joy Patra & Ayan Mukherjee, Integrate Device Data with Smart
Contracts in IBM Blockchain, IBM: IBM DEVELOPER (June 1, 2017), https://developer.
ibm.com/articles/cl-blockchain-for-cognitive-iot-apps-trs/.
178. Watson (Computer), supra note 175.
179. Aditya Kaul, IBM Watson IoT and Its Integration with Blockchain, TRACTICA (Aug. 1,
2016), https://www.tractica.com/automation-robotics/ibm-watson-iot-and-its-integrationwith-blockchain/.
180. Watson Internet of Things—What Is the IoT?, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/internetof-things/learn/what-is-iot/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2020); Internet of Things, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_of_things (last visited Feb. 13, 2020). An “object”
in the context of the Internet of Things is any item connected to the Internet capable of
collecting and transferring information over a network without human assistance. Id.
181. Internet of Things, supra note 180.
182. Kaul, supra note 179. Watson IoT customers include: airlines, car manufacturers,
telecom companies, etc. Id.
183. IBM Named an Internet of Things Software Platform Leader, Launches Global Watson IoT
Consulting Solutions, IBM (Nov. 21, 2016), http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/
pressrelease/51089.wss.
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IBM’s objective is that customers—once they begin realizing
benefits from the technology—will add additional data to the
platform and eventually become a paying customer willing to
expand their free prototypes into larger scale production.184
B. IBM Blockchain
Watson IoT recently integrated with the IBM Blockchain, which
serves as the company’s DLT platform that facilitates transactions
between parties.185 This integration allows the connected IoT
devices of business clients to interact with one another and send
any relevant interactions or collected data to private distributed
ledgers within the IBM network.186 Data gathered from those
devices can be monitored and analyzed for business intelligence,
then utilized to create smart contracts.187 Smart contracts update
and validate the data sent to the distributed ledger and
subsequently deliver it to all interested participants in the business
network.188 All business partners have a record of each transaction,
effectively preventing disputes and ensuring each partner is held
accountable for their individual roles in the overall transaction.
Such decentralized integration effectively reduces the need for
human monitoring and improves the security of IoT solutions by
implementing specific consensus mechanisms that guard against
compromised devices.189
C. IBM Integration of Watson IoT & Blockchain
By integrating Watson IoT with IBM Blockchain, the company
attempts to lock-in customers to its broader business ecosystem to
capture value.190 Initially free of charge, potential customers link
IoT devices and data to Watson IoT to manage their information.
These entities often become paying customers once they realize the
added benefits of incorporating their data with the rest of the IBM

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Kaul, supra note 179.
Id.
Gantait et al., supra note 177.
Id.
Id.
See infra Figure 4.0.
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platform (e.g., increased accuracy and efficiency through a more
transparent shipping process). When a customer makes this
transition, IBM effectively reconfigures the customer’s supply
chain through its Blockchain. In other words, the integrated
technologies enable IBM employees to design contractual
relationships for customers using smart contract code—which has
the potential to drastically reduce a customer’s need for natural
language agreements through lawyers. Customers, in turn, achieve
inexpensive ongoing management and execution of highly specific
and mundane transaction obligations.
IBM creates value for customers by providing contract
maintenance and improvement, and captures financial returns for
these efforts through an ongoing management fee. These
innovative contract improvements—achieved primarily through
more efficient or effective smart contract code—are insulated from
competitors, which makes IBM the exclusive beneficiary of such
developments. As more information is linked to the IBM platform,
customers increase in loyalty, which often lengthens the paid
business relationship between the customer and IBM. The company
also realizes returns by leveraging and applying intelligence from
previously developed smart legal contracts (e.g., reusing existing
smart contract code as a model) across multiple contracts and
customers with similar transactional needs. Such versatile
applications of contract innovations not only allocate costs across a
range of customers but also reduce contract production time. Faster
production time enables IBM to more quickly and easily create
value for new customers, which attracts and incentivizes even more
customers to join the platform. These realities place commercial
entities, like IBM, in an optimal position to capture value and
achieve financial returns from contract innovation.
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Figure 4.0: Device Integration with IBM Watson IoT & IBM
Blockchain. Derived from: Tractica & IBM
D. IBM Integration with GitHub
A similar, but alternative, avenue IBM uses to introduce
potential customers to its propriety platform is GitHub, a
community repository for open-source computer code.191 IBM has
developed and made available a series of sample distributed ledger
contracts on GitHub. These sample contracts are freely accessible to
the public and currently organized by and limited to a discrete
number of industry use cases (e.g., aviation supply chain sample
contract). In addition, the open-source community nature of
GitHub allows individuals to contribute to the sample contracts,
which may further enrich and optimize their effectiveness. IBM
intends these sample contracts to be an introductory resource for
potential customers looking to begin blockchain development and
integration with Watson IoT. The company’s ultimate objective,
however, is to transition non-paying users of these bare-bone
samples to paying customers on IBM’s private platform, which
offers far more applicable and customizable smart contracts. While,
in theory, any IBM competitor could easily view and mimic the
sample contracts on GitHub, such access is of no concern to IBM—
the true proprietary information is the way in which IBM links
191. GitHub, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GitHub (last visited Feb.
13, 2020).
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multiple smart legal contracts together, effectively enabling its
customers to reduce mundane transaction costs and gain largescale market efficiencies. Accordingly, a small selection of sample
contracts in the hands of an IBM competitor is simply an
insufficient amount of information to pose any real threat to the
proprietary nature of the company’s services. Thus, the sample
contracts made available on GitHub likely stand as an effective
customer acquisition tool for IBM’s proprietary platform.
VII. DO PROPRIETARY CONTRACT PLATFORMS
PROMOTE CONSUMER WELFARE?
Of course, the technology solutions offered by IBM and other
commercial entities cannot possibly address all transactional needs
of customers. Still, their solutions are incredibly effective at
managing mundane transactions and, therefore, are likely to have
a positive influence on consumer welfare. More efficient
contracting, for example, reduces transactional costs between
entities, which may result in more accessible and lower priced
products and services for end customers.192 Less expensive contract
production coupled with greater efficiency in development and
management makes the technology an attractive supplement to—
or even replacement for—the role of transactional law firms. With
blockchain to manage their mundane transactions, customers
utilizing these solutions no longer have the same need for a
transactional lawyer to complete such work. Instead, customers are
likely to turn to transactional law firms only for highly technical or
complex transactions not easily addressed through a developed
blockchain (i.e., those that require more senior and experienced
partner hours). Collectively, these realities are likely to make legal
services more affordable to the public at large.
The technology also addresses the burden of government
regulation, which is often a significant barrier to market efficiency.
Embedded trust and transparency within smart legal contracts will
likely reduce current market dependency on regulation. Smart
legal contracts make it more difficult for entities to breach; thus,

192. Bellamy & Hill, supra note 140.
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their increased use could reduce the amount of resulting litigation
in the court system.
For legal professionals, the impact of the technology may
appear less beneficial or even threatening to the industry’s current
model. Traditional law firms generate revenue by billing clients by
the hour. As such, greater efficiencies achieved through smart legal
contracts may diminish the number of hours a firm bills its clients.
Lower billable hours per client, however, could potentially be offset
if firms increase the number of clients they serve. Either way,
reduced customer reliance upon firms for mundane transactions
poses an interesting conundrum for the role junior transactional
lawyers will play in a firm. Since mundane transactional work is
often assigned to junior lawyers—both to train them in the art and
allow more experienced lawyers to focus time on the more
challenging transactions—their role is potentially threatened if
such work shifts away from law firms and toward commercial
entities. Without access to mundane or “training wheels” work,
junior lawyers may have a difficult time obtaining the experience
necessary to support customers in complex transactions later in
their career. Regardless, customers will no doubt come to expect
that law firms nevertheless retain the expertise and knowledge to
help develop contracts around new or existing blockchain
infrastructures.193 Thus, law firms familiar with the technology will
be best positioned, at least in the short-term, to serve client needs
and adjust their business models to address the changing
technological landscape.194
VIII. CONCLUSION
Though few legal professionals seem concerned about
maintaining or improving the quality of transactional legal
services, Triantis concludes that an emphasis on innovation that

193. Michael del Castillo, Legally Binding Smart Contracts? 10 Law Firms Join Enterprise
Ethereum Alliance, COINDESK (Aug. 15, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/legallybinding-smart-contracts-9-law-firms-join-enterprise-ethereum-alliance/.
194. Bernard Marr, Practical Examples of How Blockchains Will Be Used in Legal Firms,
FORBES (Aug. 15, 2017, 12:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/
2017/08/15/practical-examples-of-how-blockchains-will-be-used-in-legalfirms/#1439c02b66a7.
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improves contract quality—rather than simply reducing costs—
will help lawyers more effectively adapt to industry cost pressure
and emerging technologies.195 Yet, any law firm that wishes to
pursue such innovation will likely be hindered by significant
barriers in the legal industry—namely, the customary deployment
of standardized, unchanging contract terms, the limited intellectual
property protection available to drafters of novel contract
language, market resistance to the adoption of novel terms, and
structural features of legal entities that value client service over
innovation. Amidst these barriers, Triantis posits that perhaps the
only effective way for law firms to incentivize contract innovation
is through collaborative contract design strategies like
standardization and modularity.196 However, even these proposed
strategies are unlikely to successfully incentivize law firms to
innovate since they fail to assist firms in capturing and preserving
the financial returns of any innovation.
In contrast to traditional law firms, commercial entities
leveraging DLT and smart contracts are likely in a stronger position
to capture financial returns from contract innovation. As the IBM
case study illustrates, the business models of such entities
inherently insulate returns from competitors in a way that
eliminates many of the innovation barriers found in the legal
industry. The emergence of this alternative channel for legal
contract innovation suggests that, perhaps, Triantis’ concerns
regarding a lack of innovation incentives are overstated. Rather
than seek to overcome the innovation barriers that persist in an ageold industry, legal entities are likely to be more effective in contract
innovation efforts if they leverage technologies external to the legal
industry altogether. At first glance, this hypothesis may appear to
threaten the current legal model by reducing reliance among
contracting parties upon traditional transactional lawyers. Yet, the
technology solutions of IBM and other commercial entities are only
a practical threat to the more mundane and simplistic contracts
currently provided by law firms. Instead of outright replacing legal
services, DLT and smart contract technology will more realistically

195. Triantis, supra note 3, at 179–80; see also HARVARD LAW TODAY, supra note 4.
196. Triantis, supra note 3, at 202–04; see also Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at 286–92.
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serve as a supplement to the industry. Supplementing traditional
legal services with these technologies will ultimately facilitate less
expensive contract production, effectively promoting consumer
welfare through more efficient contract enforcement, which is
essential to long-term economic growth and development.
Erika J. Nash*

* J.D., Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School.
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